Hu's vision for China

Hu is widely expected to become the next leader of China

(CNN) -- While in Kuala Lumpur last week, Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao told journalists it was not true that he was an enigmatic figure.

However, as he embarks on a historic tour of the United States, little is known about the 59-year-old politician who will soon become general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and state president.

Here are ten priorities that knowledgeable sources in Beijing think a Hu administration will tackle during a tenure that will probably run into the year 2012:

Implementing 'elitist politics'

The question uppermost on the minds of Hu's White House hosts -- as well as congressmen and commentators -- is whether the youthful-looking 'core' of the Fourth Generation leadership may pick up the threads of political reform that was frozen in 1989.

AUDIO Willy Lam talks about Hu Jintao selling China to the U.S. 1.7 MB / 2 mins WAV sound James Lilley, Former U.S. Ambassador to China on the U.S. reaction to the vice-president's visit 1.71 MB / 2 mins 10 secs WAV sound

However, it is likely that Hu and colleagues such as Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao -- the frontrunner to become premier in March 2003 -- will continue to eschew 'Western style' democratic practices such as one person one vote and multi-party politics.

Hu and company will instead pursue 'elitist democracy' through widening the base of the ruling elite within the framework of one-party dictatorship.

More public examinations will be held to recruit officials of up to the rank of heads or vice-heads of bureau, which in the Chinese hierarchy, is two rungs below that of vice-ministers.

Moreover, more elite members of the 'new classes' such as entrepreneurs and professionals -- including those with foreign degrees -- will be picked as advisers and even officials of up to vice-ministerial rank.

'Inner party democracy'

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Perhaps more headway may be made in what is known as 'inner party democracy,' or modernizing the CCP's Leninist structure.

Some liberal cadres deemed close to Hu have expressed the hope that the CCP may evolve into an entity such as Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, where clear-cut factions can vie for supremacy in a transparent fashion.

Others have urged that regional leaders such as the party bosses of cities and provinces should be voted into office -- first via indirect, and then direct, election -- by CCP members resident in those regions.

However, it is unlikely that Hu will have the political support to bring about the 'peaceful evolution' of the CCP into a Western European-style socialist democratic party.

Taming the PLA

The People's Liberation Army remains the wild card in the coming decade or so.

Given Beijing's increasing reliance on the army and the para-military People's Armed Police to crush social unrest, Hu may have to buy the support of the generals through giving them big annual budget hikes -- and a big say in policy.

However, in light of his lack of military credentials, it will be to Hu's advantage to consider the guojiahua of the army, meaning turning the PLA from an adjunct of the CCP into a regular state army that is subject to the scrutiny of parliamentary bodies.

PLA 'civilianization' will make it easier for a civilian leader to control the top brass -- and harder for the latter to interfere in politics.

Open door policy

There is little doubt that in the post-WTO world, Hu -- and Wen -- will continue to push for China's thorough integration with the global marketplace.

The pro-market bias of the new leadership may also have to do with the fact that many of the sons and daughters of Fourth Generations cadres are trained abroad and are employees or joint venture partners of multinationals.

However, analysts expect the Hu team to be tougher than the Jiang administration in trade negotiations with the West.

And should unemployment worsen, the new leadership will have no qualms in emulating the Japanese or South Koreans in erecting hidden trade barriers.

Central and Western regions

Analysts say Hu has no choice but to show he can stand up to the Americans

Perhaps the most significant change that a Hu administration will bring about is a reorientation of priorities in favor of the neglected zhongxibu, or central and western provinces.

Since the early 1980s, China's top leaders have almost without exception been representatives of coastal regions such as Guangdong and Shanghai.

Having spent a good chunk of their careers in poor hinterland regions, Hu and such colleagues as Vice-Premier Wen have a personal interest in reviving the fortunes of the zhongxibu.

However, Hu and Wen have to handle the kind of criticism that has already been leveled at Premier Zhu Rongji for committing billions of yuan to infrastructure projects in the zhongxibu, which is integral to Zhu's strategy of stimulating growth through boosting domestic demand.

Quite a number of the new railroads, highways and airports planned for the zhongxibu have dubious economic viability.

Disadvantaged sectors

While visiting Malaysia last week, Hu admitted that unemployment was the single most daunting challenge for the Chinese leadership.

Having earned his spurs in the hard-scrabble countryside of Gansu and Guizhou provinces, Hu might be in a better position than affiliates of President Jiang Zemin's Shanghai Faction to project an image of genuine concern for the disadvantaged sectors.

Whether Fourth Generation stalwarts can really crack the whip on corruption -- which underpins the worsening polarization between rich and poor -- will be the big test for a Hu administration.

A more aggressive U.S. policy

A hardening of Beijing's U.S. policy will not be evident during Hu's on-going American tour and indeed, in the first few years of his tenure.

Yet it seems probable that the new leader will, probably in his second term of 2007 to 2012, significantly revise the policy of 'avoiding confrontation while seeking cooperation' that was laid down by late patriarch Deng Xiaoping and followed closely by Jiang.

Jiang's so-called 'pro-U.S.' policy was partly evidenced by his efforts to establish personal rapport with American presidents -- and to forge a 'constructive, strategic partnership' with Washington.

However, a growing number Beijing's foreign policy wonks, including Hu advisers, have started to dismiss Jiang's U.S. policy as 'romantic, weak and soft.'

Analysts say that given the rise of nationalism not only among the PLA but disparate social strata, Hu has no choice but to show he can stand up to the Americans.

European Union focus

Hu, slated to become the head of the CCP's Leading Group on Foreign Affairs, will make a fundamental departure from patriarch Deng's dictum on diplomacy: 'Keep a low profile; and never take the lead.'

Particular emphasis will be put on counteracting the preponderance of the U.S. through consolidating ties with major countries and blocs such as Russia and the European Union, and with the United Nations.

Chinese officials familiar with Hu's European trip last October said the vice-president was very impressed with the potentials of Europe both as China's trading and hi-tech partner but also a viable force in the cause of multi-polarism.

Policy on Taiwan

Hu is expected to be tough on Taiwan for much the same reason that he has to be seen as capable of playing hard-ball with Washington.

Given that Taiwan is a highly emotional issue for many Chinese, it takes a leader with a firm grip on power to dare come up with bold initiatives such as making a journey of peace to Taipei.

Jiang went some way -- but not far enough -- in this direction with his eight-point proposal of reconciliation in early 1995.

Hu may lack the stature and overall political support for unveiling a genuinely new deal for Taiwan.

Ethnic minorities

Hu is one of the few post-1949 leaders who have personal experience running an autonomous region with huge ethnic minorities.

While his stint in Tibet may afford Hu some political capital to be more flexible or tolerant toward either Tibet or Xinjiang, it is unlikely that the new leader will depart from the established policy of heavy-handed control.

The CCP leadership has since September 11 skillfully taken advantage of the anti-terrorist campaign to crack down hard on Xinjiang and Tibet.

And there is a consensus in Beijing that the momentum is on their side -- and a display of unwonted leniency may only encourage the 'splittists' to make more mischief against central authorities.