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World awaits new China regime
By Willy Wo-Lap Lam
(CNN) -- Foreign observers of the on-going leadership transition in Beijing are most interested in one issue: Who will run China's diplomatic and national security apparatus after the upcoming 16th Communist party Congress? The question has added urgency because, for much of the past decade, President Jiang Zemin and Vice-Premier Qian Qichen have dominated foreign and military policies, as well as matters relating to intelligence, state security, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Yet both Jiang, 76 and Qian, 74, are retiring from the Politburo by the middle of the month. On the surface, much of their powers should go to Vice-President Hu Jintao, due to become party general secretary at the 16th Congress and state president next March. And although Jiang may hang on to the post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) for a year or so, Hu is also tipped to take over the commander-in-chief's slot. According to tradition, the party chief and president also heads the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs (LGFA), China's top organ on diplomacy. It is also likely that Hu will take the helm at the Leading Group on Taiwan Affairs (LGTA), which steers policies in the area of national reunification. Yet the picture is much more complicated because Hu, who has little experience in security issues, will at most be a first among equals among a host of veterans as well as new players. It is probable that Jiang, whose basic interests and expertise are foreign -- not economic or other domestic -- affairs, will continue to exercise sizeable influence in diplomacy. Formation of new councilLast week, Japanese and Hong Kong papers reported the imminent establishment of a National Security Council (NSC) in which Jiang and other party elders would figure prominently. Diplomatic analysts in Beijing have discounted the possibility of the NSC's formation in the foreseeable future. "The idea of an NSC, a Jiang brainchild, has been circulated among senior officials since late 2000," said a Western diplomat. "Yet Politburo members not from the Jiang faction, including [Premier] Zhu Rongji and Li Ruihuan, have hotly opposed the idea because this is seen as a vehicle for Jiang to continue his influence." The diplomat said, however, that for at least one year, an informal organ along the lines of a National Security Leading Group (NSLG) had begun meeting on an ad hoc basis. While the LGFA deals mainly with traditional foreign policy issues, the NSLG's brief encompasses all matters pertaining to national security: strategic and military issues, intelligence, energy and even aspects of finance, foreign trade and foreign exchange rates. Moreover, the NSLG has authority to call on cadres and experts in the relevant departments for policy input. The diplomat said that while it was likely that the NSLG would remain an informal, secretive body after the 16th Congress, it might meet more frequently and assume greater clout. Key Jiang protégé Zeng Qinghong, who is due to join the elite Politburo Standing Committee at the Congress, has been a key figure behind NSLG operations. "Jiang will likely continue to take part in NSLG deliberations as long as he is chairman of the military commission," said a Beijing source close to the security establishment. "After retirement, Jiang will make his influence felt through Zeng." Indeed, diplomats in Beijing expect Zeng, who has developed an expertise on relations with Japan, Southeast Asia and the U.S., to join the LGFA in a senior capacity. And the former Shanghai vice-party secretary is also tipped to become a Vice-Head of the LGTA. Apart from Hu and Zeng, major foreign policymakers after the 16th Congress will include the successor to Qian as the Politburo member and vice-premier in charge of foreign policy. Foreign-policy portfolio
Analysts say the field is wide open partly because all four incumbent vice-premiers are expected to either change jobs or retire when the new cabinet is formed at the National People's Congress next March. Executive Vice-Premier Li Lanqing, 70, is due to step down in tandem with Jiang and Qian. Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao is slated to succeed Zhu as premier, while colleague Wu Bangguo may become Executive Vice-Premier. The analysts say among the new vice-premiers, State Councilor Wu Yi could assume Qian's mantle. Wu, China's highest ranked female cadre, has ample experience in trade policy as well as negotiations with foreign governments. She has received high praise from Zhu for handling China's accession to the World Trade Organization -- and Zhu is reportedly pushing hard for her to succeed Qian. It is understood, however, that Jiang faction affiliates, including Zeng and Qian, are not too enthusiastic about Wu holding the crucial foreign-policy portfolio. Should Wu get the job, China's three foremost officials handling foreign and security issues -- Hu, Zeng and Wu -- will come from as many factions. The lack of a dominant personality will probably mean the continuation of existing platforms and practices at least in the coming two years or so. Take policy toward the United States, which has borne the personal imprint of Jiang, a faithful implementer of the Deng Xiaoping dictum of "boosting cooperation and avoiding confrontation" with the superpower. On quite a few occasions, Hu has made statements about the U.S. that are more hard-line than his boss. In internal talks late last year, the vice-president warned against the "eastward strategic movement" of American forces, which was made with the purpose of "containing" China. This has given rise to speculation that because the vice-president will be much less able than Jiang to rein in the hawks in the army, Beijing may pursue a more aggressive U.S. policy a couple of years down the road. However, a source close to the Hu camp said the vice-president has since moved to a more centrist position. For example, Hu has played a substantial role in Beijing's handling of the global crisis over Washington's possible military attack on Iraq. The leadership is in a dilemma because it wants to maintain good relations with the United States and at the same time demonstrate its solidarity with Third World, Muslim countries. "Hu is one of the senior cadres who came up with the idea that instead of displaying a clear-cut initiative on Iraq, Beijing should follow the lead of Moscow and Paris particularly during United Nations deliberations on the issue," the source said. "This is a means of avoiding direct confrontation with Washington while emphasizing Beijing's long-standing principle of fighting global terrorism while working through the U.N."
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