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China seeks payback for N. Korea efforts
By CNN Senior China Analyst Willy Wo-Lap Lam
HONG KONG, China (CNN) -- Taiwan in exchange for North Korea -- this formula pretty much sums up Beijing's expectations about relations with the United States in the foreseeable future. Put simply, the Chinese leadership is hoping that in return for using its influence to rein in the regime in Pyongyang, Washington will play its part in putting a damper on the "creeping independence" of Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian. While the first round of the six-nation talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis in Beijing last month was largely unproductive, Beijing is confident it has impressed the global community, particularly the United States, about its clout with Pyongyang. Despite the vocal rhetoric from North Korean leader Kim Jong Il about building a nuclear arsenal as a legitimate tool of self-defense, there are signs Pyongyang may be ready for some form of a climb-down. Thus on September 9, the 55th birthday of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pyongyang did not carry out its threat of testing potent weapons such as a medium-range missile or nuclear bomb. While the erratic Kim might have his own reasons to exercise restraint, Beijing is exuding confidence about its ability to hold Pyongyang back from the brink. And there are indications the U.S. has expressed its appreciation for Beijing's cooperation in its global campaign against terrorism, and in particular, the North Korean imbroglio. 'Cooperative relationship'Earlier this month, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said U.S.-China relations "are the best they have been since President Nixon's first visit" to China in 1972. This enthusiasm was reciprocated by President Hu Jintao a few days later. While meeting former president Jimmy Carter in Beijing, Hu said "practice has shown that developing healthy and stable Sino-U.S. relations tallies with the fundamental interests of the two peoples, and is beneficial to [global] peace, stability and development." Apart from upbeat sound bites, the U.S. has undertaken some gestures to demonstrate its willingness to nurture what President George W. Bush earlier called a "constructive, cooperative relationship" with Beijing. Full-scale military-to-military relations, halted by the spy plane incident of April 2001, will be resumed this fall. Defense Minister General Cao Gangchuan is due to visit the U.S. next month, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers will be touring China soon after that. While it is unlikely that Bush will lift the Tiananmen Square-related embargo on the export of hi-tech and military material to China, the resumption of high-level military ties will contribute to the lessening of tension. Yuan revaluationOn the nettlesome question of human rights, Washington has largely desisted from criticism of the Hu administration's lapses. This is despite signs that the Fourth Generation leadership has started cracking down on dissent after a short period of limited liberalization. While Bush had incurred Beijing's ire by seeing the Dalai Lama last week, he was only continuing the practice of past presidents in affording high-level protocol to the spiritual leader. Washington has been generally reticent about growing evidence of the "Sinicization" of Lhasa and other Tibetan cities, which is cited by international watchdogs as part of a plot to displace Tibetan culture. Moreover, the Bush administration has demonstrated unwonted restraint concerning the hot-button issue of the undervalued yuan and China's trade surplus with America. While Secretary of the Treasury John Snow and Bush himself have asked Beijing to consider a yuan revaluation, they have indicated Washington has no intention of using strong-armed tactics such as punitive tariffs to force Beijing's hand. Taiwan card
But how about the issue of Taiwan, which Hu has characterized as the No. 1 irritant in bilateral ties -- and where Beijing hopes Washington will work hardest in return for more Chinese input on the North Korean issue? It is true that Bush has refrained from selling Taiwan top-of-the-line weapons such as Aegis-class destroyers -- and that Washington was quick in expressing disapproval of President Chen's plans to hold referendums on a series of political issues. Yet most Chinese strategic analysts, who do not believe Powell's reiteration that American welcomes a strong China, are convinced the U.S. will keep playing the Taiwan card to halt China's metamorphosis into a quasi-superpower. Recent developments, however, indicate the Hu leadership is confident that, apart from Beijing's clout on the Korean and other anti-terrorist fronts, it can count on China's seemingly unstoppable economic juggernaut to pull strings in Washington. A key reason behind Deng Xiaoping's dictum on relations with America -- "keep a low profile and avoid confrontation" -- is precisely that China needs to concentrate on economic construction. A Beijing diplomatic source said the authorities reckoned that mutual economic dependence between China and the U.S. could be quantified as between 65:35 to 60:40 -- meaning that China still needed the U.S. more than vice versa. "We have a way to go before attaining the parity level of 50:50," he said. "Yet given China's exponential growth, the threshold of exact mutual reliance could be reached sooner than expected, say, in around ten years." The source added that as American economic dependence on China grows, large corporations and ordinary consumers alike will be putting pressure on Washington to give a relatively sympathetic hearing to China's political aspirations. Indeed, lobbying by multinationals with huge exposure in China is one reason why Washington has at least temporarily decided not to play hardball with Beijing over the yuan. And Hu and his advisers are hopeful that geopolitical -- as well as economic -- calculus will also swing the U.S. China's way so far as the latter's "renegade province" is concerned.
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