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Web-only Exclusives November 30, 2000 From Our Correspondent: Hirohito and the War A conversation with biographer Herbert Bix From Our Correspondent: A Rough Road Ahead Bad news for the Philippines - and some others From Our Correspondent: Making Enemies Indonesia needs friends. So why is it picking fights? |
NOVEMBER 12, 1999 VOL. 25 NO. 45
Diplomatic License
An Asiaweek-PECC roundtable considers the regional impact of the East Timor situation
 Sarasin Viraphol Pictures by Edwin Tuyay for Asiaweek |
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Asiaweek: Could the East Timor crisis have been averted?
ALSO IN ASIAWEEK
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Bolger: But would the Indonesian government have allowed us to do anything before the referendum? The international community accepted public statements from the highest level of the [Indonesian] government and military that there would be a peaceful transition. Given that, on what grounds do you go in and tell them effectively that you don't accept that?
Ramos: Of course, I'm saying this from hindsight, but maybe some early negotiations with the Indonesian government could have been started. We must credit Australia for taking the initiative and picking up the ball. [Jakarta] must also credit moves by some of the ASEAN members to do something as an organization, short of military or police intervention.
Asiaweek: Yet there is a perception that ASEAN somehow failed to act.
Ramos: It shouldn't be called a failure. We just don't have the capability. But our intervention took the form of negotiations and diplomacy - and NGO support. We were there even during the election.
Hawke: ASEAN was never set up to interfere in the internal political affairs of its members. It's an exercise in complete stupidity to say that ASEAN didn't do what it wasn't set up to do and what it committed itself not to do.
Sarasin: The Thai response contradicts the assertion [that ASEAN responded slowly]. We responded very quickly when we were given indications by Indonesia that they were ready to have us come aboard and jointly intervene with Australia. That was the code of conduct, if you will.
Bolger: But even if it had been within ASEAN's purview, you still would have been left with the dilemma of how you go into what at that stage still was a sovereign country and say that we don't accept your assurances. That's an enormous dilemma. If you look at Kosovo, you see a different response by NATO. They did it with overwhelming power and didn't wait for the U.N. That was never going to be contemplated in East Timor.
Hawke: I've heard criticism about the way Australia handled the situation, but I can say quite categorically that [Prime Minister John] Howard was right in asserting the reality that you would be declaring war if you went in without permission. Our relations with Indonesia are at rock bottom, but they are recoverable.
 Bob Hawke |
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Lee: Both ruling and opposition parties in South Korea supported the intervention, but the opposition was concerned about sending combatant troops because we have very big business interests in Indonesia - more than $10 billion in investments - and our firms employ more than 200,000 workers. We are also concerned that our troops are under an Australian commander because Indonesians have doubts about Australia's goals. We know we have to cooperate to restore peace, but we are in a difficult situation. Our foreign minister said that the U.S. requested us to commit troops. I criticized this heavily because we may be pictured as the deputy of the U.S. in Asia.
Asiaweek: Is there any significance to China's sending a team of police officers?
Hawke: China would have concluded two things. First, that what was going on [in East Timor] wasn't tolerable and it would make sense for them to be associated [with the intervention]. They would have also thought about whether if they [participated], would it have any implications for their own [internal] affairs. China decided that they should be associated, albeit in a modest way. This seems to be a perfectly sensible decision.
Sarasin: It fits in with China's strategy of bilaterally and multilaterally becoming [engaged as] part of Southeast Asia and gaining greater acceptance by the region.
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 Lee Shin-Bom |
Hawke: I would argue that what may happen within Indonesia is potentially the greatest threat to security in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia. We need to help Indonesia get back on its feet economically. People don't fully understand the dimensions of the economic disaster. Absolute poverty has gone back up to 40%-50% of the population. If you have the combination of economic collapse and [separatist] movements like what you've got in Aceh and Irian Jaya, then it's going to be a pretty volatile mix.
Ramos: The IMF (which on Nov. 2 announced it would resume aid to Jakarta) can be more flexible. Indonesia has new leaders. The [Wahid-Megawati] combination is a high poker hand. The world community's main consideration should be to support Indonesia's viability as one republic.
Asiaweek: President Ramos has proposed that the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum's role be widened to include politics and security issues. Is this feasible?
Hawke: In an ideal world, it would be a good idea and I would support it conceptually. But given APEC's composition, you won't get agreement. Take China and Malaysia - I can't see them agreeing to this concept.
 Jim Bolger |
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Asiaweek: U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan says that humanitarian concerns can trump sovereignty. Kosovo, East Timor - is this diplomacy for the next century?
Bolger: Let's see what happens in Chechnya before the secretary-general's views are cemented. Humanitarian concerns are paramount in many ways, but the dictates of realism are also equally paramount.
Garnaut: The world will be in a real mess if interventions outside the U.N. framework become acceptable. For all its imperfections, [acting under] the U.N. framework at least means that there is broad acceptance among the great powers. There is some utility in that.
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 Fidel Ramos |
Garnaut: There should have been more effort to do something at an earlier stage.
Hawke: But there wasn't. I'm not disagreeing with you, but the problem with the Kofi Annan exposition is that the reality is that you're going to have to deal with situations on an ad hoc basis. I doubt very much if you're going to be able to have an a priori formulation of principle which is going to satisfy every situation.
Ramos: What happened in Kosovo proves my point on East Timor. When you plan something, you had better prepare for all the downstream implications, including the worst-case scenario.
Bolger: Kosovo should not lead us to believe there is a new doctrine. It was an aberration. We'll make decisions on individual cases. Now that's not a perfect system. We should be treating each case the same. We should have a set of rules. But the world is not perfect either. I don't see any new paradigms for future situations. It's not going to happen.
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