Pakistanis protesting about India's nuclear tests

By Andrew Koch
Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information

Now that the dust has settled on the nuclear testing sites in India and Pakistan, it is time that the United States end its hypocritical nuclear posture. Changing U.S. nuclear policy away from the current "do as we say, not as we do" posture is vitally important if proliferation is to be halted.

The interlocking framework of treaties and agreements that have been cobbled together, generally referred to as the non-proliferation regime, is at a crossroads. On the one hand are states that, over the long term, could emulate South Asia's direct challenge to the non-proliferation regime. The recent tests will undoubtedly strengthen the hand of hard-liners in states such as North Korea and Iran who may wish to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the United States has an opportunity to demonstrate that India and Pakistan made a serious miscalculation by pursuing expensive weapon systems which detract rather than enhance their security. Fortunately, there is still time to act because the emergence of another new nuclear power is not likely over the short term.

As the chief non-proliferation advocate, the United States has a significant interest in halting proliferation. Yet, perversely, the United States continues to pursue a hypocritical nuclear policy that encourages others to proliferate. One of several rationales for the Indian tests was to challenge the non-proliferation regime, which New Delhi views as discriminatory. What particularly peeked India's ire was the fact that the nuclear powers have not adequately fulfilled their obligation to move toward nuclear disarmament as promised under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Policymakers in New Delhi wonder why Washington, Beijing and Moscow should be allowed to retain enormous nuclear arsenals when India, the world's largest democracy, is denied that right.

In an attempt to discourage other states from seeking the bomb, the Clinton Administration has argued that nuclear weapons are no longer an important determinant of international power or prestige. However, the US has not been willing to support its rhetoric with actions. Now that India and Pakistan have called our bluff, Washington must demonstrate its leadership and take real steps to reduce America's nuclear stockpile.

The Clinton Administration should move to unilaterally take a portion of our most threatening nuclear weapons, such as MX missiles, off of alert status. De-alerting the MX, which is scheduled to be scrapped under the START II treaty in any event, would be a welcome sign to Russia that the US no longer threatens its security. Such a move should be followed-up by encouraging Russia to also de-alert its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, the Clinton Administration should take advantage of Moscow's willingness to negotiate deep reductions in both side's nuclear forces sooner rather than latter. This would greatly enhance America's security by eliminating thousands of nuclear weapons that could strike the US heartland. Concurrently, it would also send a loud signal that the US is serious about fulfilling its NPT obligations and strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

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The entire onus is not on the Clinton Administration, however. The U.S. Senate must also show its wisdom and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Without accession to that treaty, the U.S. is left in a position of criticizing other states for conducting nuclear tests without forswearing that option ourselves.

If the events in South Asia have taught us one lesson it is that maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert has adversely effected America's security by encouraging others to seek the bomb, while ironically providing little power to stop that outcome.

The author's views are his own, and are not necessarily endorsed by CNN Interactive.

Andrew Koch joined the Center for Defense Information (CDI) as a Senior Research Analyst in September 1997. Mr. Koch covers and has written widely on nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and ballistic missiles, including proliferation, arms control, and verification issues. Additionally, he closely tracks political-military developments in South Asia and the Persian Gulf.

Prior to joining CDI, Mr. Koch worked as a Senior Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in Monterey, California. At the CNS, Mr. Koch supervised a database on nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia and the Middle East and developed in-depth profiles of Iran's, Pakistan's, and Yugoslavia's nuclear programs. Currently, he is completing a similar project on India's nuclear capabilities.

Mr. Koch previously worked at several governmental and non-governmental organizations, including the United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Arms Control Association, and the Embassy of Greece in Washington, DC. He received his MA in international affairs from George Washington University and his BA in international relations from Boston University.

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