Iraq's Army Organization
Since 1991, the Iraqi High Command has been engaged in a desperate
attempt to rebuild its armed forces in order both to confront external
threats such as Iran and the Western-backed Gulf Co-operation Council
(GCC) states, and to suppress domestic rebels in the north and the
south of the country. Although the debate continues over the exact
size of the losses suffered by Iraq in 1991, it is likely that the
army ended the war, and subsequent uprisings, with as little as a
quarter of its pre-war divisional strength, a quarter of pre-war
manpower and half of its equipment. The rebuilding has taken place
against a background of political instability, with numerous senior
officers losing their lives in coup attempts and purges, and in light
of the impossibility of obtaining new equipment or spare parts due to
the UN embargo. Reorganisation and retraining programmes have also
been disrupted by operations against Shi'ite rebels in the south and
the Kurds in the north.
Nonetheless, the Iraqi military has been able to reconstitute a
considerable portion of its pre-Desert Storm combat power. Despite
massive equipment losses, Iraq's military remains a potent threat to
its neighbours. Once the country is again able to import modern
hardware and, crucially, spares and logistical support equipment, then
its military may well be able to re-emerge as a dominant force in the
Gulf.
The army has consistently operated with a hollow organisational
structure. Its large numbers of divisions have never been manned and
equipped according to their tables of organisation and equipment. In
theory, regular armoured divisions prior to Desert Storm had 12,100
men and 245 tanks, while infantry divisions had 14,100 men and 78
tanks. In practice, these complements were not reached. Divisional
structures were often intended to be filled out by reservists or
additional conscripts in time of crisis but, as the allied victory
showed, the quality and dedication of many of these men were not very
high. As a consequence of the equipment losses in 1991, even Iraq's
reduced number of divisions cannot fill their mandated equipment
holdings. This discrepancy between nominal and real strength certainly
deluded outside observers during the Gulf crisis, and it is quite
likely that it deluded Saddam himself as to the true state of his
military establishment.
However, since the 1991 Gulf war, the army has been the prime focus
of the rebuilding effort. The approach since 1991 has been to reduce
the numbers of formations and personnel, amalgamate units and
concentrate on rebuilding armoured and mechanised units. In 1991, the
army was infantry heavy but it now has more armoured and mechanised
formations. The number of regular army divisions has fallen from about
seven armoured/mechanised and 20 infantry divisions to two or three
armoured divisions, three mechanised divisions and 15 to 17 infantry
divisions. These divisions are, at least nominally, structured along
the following lines.
Armoured divisions have two armoured and a mechanised brigade;
mechanised divisions have two mechanised and one armoured brigade;
while infantry divisions have three infantry brigades and a tank
battalion. Armoured brigades have three armoured and a mechanised
battalion while mechanised brigades have three mechanised and a tank
battalion. Divisions usually have four artillery battalions in
support. These regular units are generally equipped with the BTR
series of vehicles and older Soviet tanks such as the T-55 and T-62.
An unknown number of the T-55s were upgraded before 1991 with the T-72
(125 mm) gun while others have applique armour.
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