Weapons disputes leave fallout of distrust, fear

(CNN) -- The cease-fire agreement that ended the Persian Gulf War contained several limitations on Saddam Hussein's military power. The clause that has proven most troublesome in the decade since concerns Iraq's programs to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, collectively labeled weapons of mass destruction, or WMDs. But even after military strikes and on-again-off-again inspections, the status of Iraq's weapons programs remains uncertain.

There have been no inspections since 1998. But after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, President George W. Bush, citing the possibility of Iraq having weapons of mass destruction, has said that the Iraqi leader needs to be removed from office and with military force if necessary.

In May 2002, Bush said there were "no war plans on my desk" for Iraq but he also raised the specter of Iraq "linking up with an al Qaeda-type organization" to unleash weapons of mass destruction.

"We've got to use all means at our disposal to deal with Saddam Hussein," he said.

Under the cease-fire that ended the Gulf War -- and the U.N. Security Council resolution that authorized the use of force -- Iraq was to destroy its existing WMD stockpiles and missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers (93 miles) and halt any development efforts. The resolution also created the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) to carry out inspections and verify compliance.

Weapons inspectors blow up the Al-Hakam protein plant southwest of Baghdad in June 1994

"When these resolutions were passed, it was expected that compliance would require no more than 90 days," one U.S. State Department document says. But from the beginning, Iraq sought to thwart inspections of its WMD facilities. UNSCOM has accused Iraq of destroying weapons without outside monitoring, then claiming to have destroyed more weapons than they did; offering false documents on their development programs; claiming that documents did not exist, documents that were later found; and hiding weapons and the materiel to make them at "presidential sites" that they declared off-limits.

In the early years of the inspections, things seemed to be going smoothly. Rolf Ekeus, the first executive chairman of UNSCOM, said in December 1992 that the ballistic missile program was effectively destroyed. But over the next few years, UNSCOM interrupted Iraqi efforts to buy contraband missile guidance systems from Russia and Romania and rocket motors from Ukraine.

As the inspections continued, Iraq became increasingly irate, demanding an immediate end to economic sanctions and offering ever more interference to inspections. In 1998, Iraq claimed that Scott Ritter, an UNSCOM inspector who had served as a U.S. Marine in the Gulf War, was spying for the U.S. and Israel. Conditions deteriorated throughout the year, and in December, UNSCOM withdrew all its personnel. Hours after the last of the inspectors were out of the country, the U.S. and United Kingdom launched bombing raids against Iraq in an effort to make it submit to inspections. There have been no inspections since.

Saddam's best-laid plans: 1980-1991

Iraq's work in chemical weapons was most advanced; according to international observers, Iraqi troops had used chemical weapons against Iran in the 1980-1988 war and against rebellious Kurds in the northern part of the country in 1988. Inspectors found evidence that the Iraqis had produced VX nerve gas and mustard gas. Traces of VX were found on destroyed Scud missile warheads, but Iraqi authorities say their VX use never got past the test stage. Hundreds of mustard gas-filled artillery shells remain unaccounted for, according to UNSCOM.

Until 1995, Iraq flatly denied ever having a biological warfare program. In that year, Hussein Kamal, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law and the head of Iraq's WMD development efforts, defected to Jordan. He revealed that he had armed 25 Scud warheads and 157 bombs with biological warfare agents. Iraq admitted that it had developed biological weapons, and from July 1995 to September 1997 released -- three times -- its "Full, Final and Complete Disclosures." According to UNSCOM, they were anything but complete.

The Iraqis admitted to loading 16 warheads for its long-range Al-Hussein missile with botulinum toxin, and five with anthrax. They also admitted to producing 200 air-dropped bombs with biological weapons, and claimed that they were all destroyed. UNSCOM says it cannot confirm those numbers at all. The inspectors also say that vast amounts of media -- the substances used as a base to breed germs for any purpose, including biological weapons -- are unaccounted for.

Iraq apparently never built a nuclear device, though not for a lack of trying. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization charged with inspecting Iraqi nuclear sites, faced less resistance than UNSCOM, but it has been allowed only one visit since 1998, a four-day visit to confirm the presence of sealed nuclear materials at one site. The IAEA said in June 2000 that it "cannot at present provide any assurance that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations."

Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt: 1998 to the present

How dangerous are Iraq's weapons programs today? The answer depends on who you ask. Two former UNSCOM officials, each with a book published since 1998, reach very different conclusions.

"It's difficult to know exactly, because they're not being inspected," Richard Butler, who was head of UNSCOM when the inspectors last left Iraq, told CNN. "But the scattered evidence arriving sadly shows that they're back in business, that they're seeking to extend the range of their missiles, that they've recalled the nuclear weapons design team, that they rebuilt the buildings in which chemical and biological warfare substances have been made."

Butler's view is summarized in the title of his 2000 book on Iraq, "The Greatest Threat." Butler says there are other dangers, such as materials entering the black market from the former Soviet Union, "but what distinguishes Saddam is his track record for over a decade ... of making significant quantities and qualities of weapons of mass destruction, of using them against his own people. On all fronts he is a unique threat."

According to information compiled by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Iraq "could fabricate a nuclear weapon within a year" if it acquired enough uranium or plutonium; may still have thousands of chemical weapons; and continues to develop new short-range missiles. But the center warns, as does everyone, that no precise information is available.

Scott Ritter, the controversial former inspector, disagrees with such dire assessments. Iraq, he tells CNN, has been "qualitatively disarmed" since 1995; while its weapons of mass destruction have not been totally destroyed, as U.N. resolutions require, Ritter argues that Iraq retains too little of its WMD capability to pose even a regional threat. He ticks off UNSCOM's successes: "Nuclear weapons entirely destroyed. Biological weapons entirely destroyed. Ballistic missiles with long-range capability destroyed."

"By 1995, Iraq had been fundamentally disarmed," Ritter says, "and all that remained were questions. Questions are not weapons of mass destruction."

Ritter argues that the insistence on complete disarmament is unrealistic, and that the United States is using that standard as a means to maintain sanctions with the goal of deposing Saddam Hussein.

Hans Blix, the head of UNMOVIC, the agency that replaced UNSCOM in December 1999, agrees that "we can never get to 100 percent clarification."

"There will always be some computer programs, there will be diskettes, there will be drawings so they can be hidden," Blix says. "You can never be sure whether you will find all that. But that may not be so relevant. It's more the infrastructure that you are after and, of course, we foresee that there will be a monitoring for a very long time."

That monitoring is the current sticking point. Since 1998, Iraq has refused to allow U.N. inspectors and monitors into the country, demanding that economic sanctions be lifted first; the United States, in turn, says that the sanctions must not be lifted until the inspections are concluded. But support for the U.S. position is eroding, as France and Russia, among other nations, are eager to resume doing business with Iraq. The U.N. is considering compromises in talks with Iraq set to resume in February.

UNMOVIC -- the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission -- has its bags packed. Until inspectors return to Iraq, there is no firm conclusion on whether, or how many, weapons of mass destruction remain.

"The Unfinished War: A Decade Since Desert Storm" producer Jason Williams contributed to this report, which was written by CNN.com writer Andy Walton.