On the Helsinki Accords:

They were important for all the so-called dissident movements in the Soviet Bloc. They offered something that no one, probably, initially, knew they were offering. They offered a basic argument, one that is difficult to dismiss: and that is the idea of human and civil rights in the form of agreements and the closing text from Helsinki. There, communist governments guaranteed certain rights and freedoms, even though those governments, of course, had no intention of respecting them. But, nevertheless, they signed it. They had their reasons for signing it then. And these movements were based on that they took them literally and they referred to these agreements. That was one source of the idea of resistance which was non-violent and even legalistic, I'd say. All we wanted was for the government to abide by these valid laws and international treaties.

On the effect of Charter 77:

That's hard to say in one sentence. I think, with time, their work has become very much appreciated. It was appreciated, for example, later in '89, when the giant change occurred, the fall of the old government. There wasn't even a drop of blood spilled. There were groups of people, ready and able -- even if temporarily -- to take power into their own hands. The climate was there, spiritually, intellectually, and institutionally. That's one thing that can be taken as a success of the Charter, because without it, it would have been much more complicated. There wouldn't have been anyone to articulate that public will at that time.

But the deeper impact of the Charter, one that won't become evident until much later, was that it showed there are some things worth fighting for even if people have no hope of immediate success. We were considered to be a small group of crazies by most of our fellow citizens -- a group that keeps banging its head against the wall. Nevertheless, we did it for years, actually decades, and in the end it showed that when you're doing the right thing it makes sense to do it. And sometimes it becomes reality, which, in this case, it did. Sometimes it can't be realized, but that's the risk you take. You have to take it. You can't try to figure it out and do only the things you know will be successful in advance. We wouldn't get very far that way.

On the Polish Solidarity movement:

We had a very close, very friendly, relationship with the core of that Workers Defense League and we influenced each other a lot. We had secret meetings on the border with [Solidarity leaders]. They influenced us a lot and we influenced their work, their existence. There was an air of "solidarity."

Mainly, we talked about what was going on in our countries, trying to deal with the situation. At the same time, we talked about common ideals; usually we released some sort of a communique or report, so people would know such meetings took place. I remember well that occasionally we wrote the communique first and then we debated the issues, even though it should have been done the other way around. But we were afraid the police would catch us because we were followed by two sets of police -- Polish and Czech. It was very complicated to organize such a meeting. We were afraid they'd catch us, disperse us. So we wrote the communique, sent it out by messenger, and then, in peace, we met.

On the Cold War:

Events like the Hungarian revolution, Prague Spring, Solidarity in Poland or the Berlin uprising, those were events that showed and unveiled that it's not only a confrontation of two powerful forces, or superpowers, but that it's a clash between freedom and violence.

The only good thing that resulted [from the Cold War] is kind of sad. That's that for 40 years there was no war in Europe and that there wasn't a World War. That polarity, that very artificial division of the world kept the balance. There weren't tens of millions of others dead. That's the only success, [and it's a] success that's questionable, because let's remember the total cost -- a cost that will have to be paid off for a very long time.