In the 1970s, Afghanistan became a focus of superpower rivalry. Geographically strategic -- near Persian Gulf oil and Indian Ocean ports, and bordering the Soviet Central Asian republics -- a friendly Afghanistan was vital to Moscow's interests.

The Soviet Union sent hundreds of advisers to Kabul following an April 1978 military coup that brought a left-wing regime to power. Led by Nur Mohammed Taraki, the new regime began reforming Afghanistan by decree -- taking land from the owners and giving it to the peasants who worked it. Women were encouraged to stop wearing veils, and were placed in literacy classes alongside men. In the countryside, these reforms were seen as threats to ancient customs and the authority of the mullahs -- the Islamic priests. Opponents of reform burned down schools. Thousands fled to neighboring Pakistan to avoid the turmoil.

In Washington, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was convinced that the new Afghan regime -- coupled with the overthrow of the shah in neighboring Iran -- constituted a major threat to the West. He advised President Carter that Moscow might use the Afghan crisis to move south and seize the Persian Gulf's oil. The U.S. soon began sending covert aid to Islamic groups fighting the communists. The rebels called themselves the Mujahedeen, or Soldiers of God. They were mostly peasants, organized by village mullahs and landowners, with weapons captured from the communists. Moscow propaganda portrayed the Soviet-trained Afghan government army as a motivated, mechanized force. But in reality, thousands of Afghan government soldiers were deserting each month. Kabul pleaded with Moscow to send Soviet troops. Soviet leaders discussed the crisis, but took no action -- until mobs massacred Soviet advisers and their families in the Afghan city of Herat. Soon after, Kabul's request for Soviet troops moved to the top of the Kremlin's agenda.

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