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IAEA Head Responds to North Korea "H-Bomb Test"; "Charlie Hebdo" Marks One Year Since Deadly Attacks; Imagine a World. Aired 6-6:30a ET

Aired January 9, 2016 - 06:00   ET




CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN HOST (voice-over): Tonight: as the U.N. gives up to punish North Korea for its latest nuclear test, we examine Pyongyang's


Did it actually test an H-bomb and what does that mean?

My exclusive interview with the head of the IAEA and reaction from the American nuclear scientist who's got the best view inside North Korea.

Plus: one year after the "Charlie Hebdo" terror attack in Paris, the cartoonist known as Riss reflects.


RISS, CARTOONIST, "CHARLIE HEBDO": This past year has been very difficult. We had to rebuild the newspaper. We had to rebuild ourselves, confront our




AMANPOUR: Good evening, everyone, and welcome to the special weekend edition of our program. I'm Christiane Amanpour in London.

This week North Korea rocked the world by claiming that it had successfully tested its most powerful weapon to date: a hydrogen bomb, a thermonuclear

weapon much more powerful than the atomic bomb.


UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: (Speaking foreign language).


AMANPOUR: That TV news report sent alarm bells all over the globe, the United States, Japan, South Korea, even Pyongyang's longtime ally, China,

as well as Russia, all condemned the act, although soon doubts were being cast on Pyongyang's claims.


UNIDENTIFIED MALE: The initial analysis that's been conducted of the events that were reported overnight is not consistent with North Korean

claims of a successful hydrogen bomb test.


AMANPOUR: The U.N. secretary general Ban Ki-moon demanded that Kim Jong-un end all nuclear activities and punitive measures are now being discussed.

Whatever the test was, it still is a dramatic escalation of the North's capability and I asked the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Yukiya Amano, what could be done to stop North Korea now.


AMANPOUR: Welcome to the program, Mr. Amano. And let me get straight to it.

Do you believe -- do you think it's possible that North Korea could have tested the hydrogen bomb?

YUKIYA AMANO, DIRECTOR GENERAL, IAEA: The international organization called CTBTO is monitoring a nuclear test. It is collecting information on

seismic events and they have detected an unusual seismic event. However, it is still in the early stage. It will take more time to have a better

understanding of the event.

AMANPOUR: Would it surprise you if it turned out to be an H-bomb?

And does the seismic event that you talk about, the tremors, does that match the size of an H-bomb test?

AMANO: A seismic event was some around 5 --


AMANO: -- from a magnitude of 5 and it is similar to that of 2013, when North Korea conducted a test. But conducting nuclear weapons tests is a

clear violation of U.N. Security Council and it is deeply regrettable.

AMANPOUR: That is absolutely true. All the testing that it does is in violation of international laws.

But what you've just said is that the seismic reaction was no bigger than its last test, so potentially laying doubt to this claim of a hydrogen


What is the world to do about this, Mr. Amano?

You head the IAEA. Neither sanctions seem to have worked, nor has engagement worked. There was a period of engagement with North Korea but

that was very brief.

What must be done?

AMANO: I have North Korea to free implement relevant all resolution of from Security Council and IAEA. These resolutions expressed serious

concerns and called on North Korea to refrain from further such tests. IAEA is ready to contribute to the peaceful resolution.

We have the experience of -- from conducting safeguards in North Korea and our inspectors are ready and to go at short notice when requested.

AMANPOUR: But the thing is, they're not there. The North Koreans threw them out. And you don't really have eyes on their program, what's going

on. And furthermore, you yourself warned in September about much more building going on at the Yongbyon nuclear facility.

You know, describe for us their plutonium process, which we thought had been put paid to and the uranium enrichment and the centrifuge process that

seems to be gathering apace.

AMANO: The IAEA does not have the inspectors on the ground now since April 2009. But we are monitoring the situation, mainly through satellite


And as I stated in September, we have observed the activities in Yongbyon, like the construction of light water reactors or operation of the five

reactors or expanding on the enrichment facilities.

In 2013, North Korea stated that they would readjust and restart the nuclear activities in Yongbyon. All of these combined make me have

concerns. And that is why I made the statement in September.

AMANPOUR: So who do you talk to?

Who do you hope has leverage?

Again, my question and everybody's question is, how does the international community convince North Korea to stop and to roll back?

First, just to stop.

AMANO: Different stakeholders have different roles. IAEA has the responsibility on verification. The United Nations Security Council has

the responsibility to establish the response to such event.

And very importantly, on this issue, there is a framework of six-party talks that is consisting of the United States, Russia, China, South Korea

and Japan. And these countries can play a very important role.

AMANPOUR: And yet there seems no process to restart that six-party talks.

Director General Yukiya Amano, thank you very much indeed for joining us tonight. Thank you so much for joining us from Vienna.


AMANPOUR: And now we turn to Santa Fe, New Mexico, where the renowned American nuclear scientist, Siegfried Hecker, is. He has perhaps had the

best and most consistent access tracking North Korea's nuclear program and, he, too, has been warning that it's progressing by leaps and bounds.


AMANPOUR: So Professor Hecker, thank you very much for joining us. You just heard what the director general said and you've heard what the United

States has said, pouring sort of some skepticism on North Korea's claims.

From your best analysis and vantage point, what do you believe happened?

SIEGFRIED HECKER, NUCLEAR SCIENTIST: Well, the most important thing, Christiane, is they fired a successful nuclear test. You know, whether it

was a hydrogen bomb or not, of course, is important but the most important aspect, they had their fourth nuclear test.

And with that test, either they've managed to potentially make a hydrogen bomb or they've been able to manage and make one of their fission bombs,

the simpler bombs, smaller and lighter and therefore more threatening.

So I don't consider this a failure of a hydrogen bomb. Certainly the explosive magnitude was similar to their third test and more in the range

of sort of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But that certainly is plenty. And I consider that test to have been successful.

AMANPOUR: You know, you talked about making it smaller and lighter. So obviously, they're looking for kind of a miniaturization, you know, able to

put it on weapons, on ballistic missiles and the like.

Is that what you're worried about most?

HECKER: That's correct. And I think that's the direction they've gone. If you look at their program over the last 12 years, it's grown both in

size -- in other words, in terms of number of nuclear weapons, that is the nuclear materials they've been able to produce, both the plutonium and the

highly enriched uranium -- and then clearly through the testing program they've tried to make it smaller.

And I would say that this test most likely was aimed precisely as to how to make them smaller and lighter. And one possibility in doing that is not

only to make a smaller and lighter fission or normal atomic bomb but perhaps to sort of go halfway between an atomic bomb and a hydrogen bomb.

And that is what we call a boosted fission bomb. In other words, it's one that's like turbocharged fission bomb.


HECKER: And this boosting process actually uses hydrogen isotopic fuels. So it would be a fusion process but it's really not a hydrogen bomb. But

it's possible that they went in that direction. That would also allow them, in the end, to make the warheads smaller and lighter so they can

mount them on a missile.

AMANPOUR: So whatever they've done, it's progress from their point of view and from their capacity.

You were there a few years ago when they showed you a secret, a hitherto secret facility for uranium enrichment. You've also been in China, talking

amongst a whole group of experts, about, as you rightly say now, their expanded stockpile.

Tell us what they have, as best as you or anybody knows.

HECKER: So in 2010, when I was there in November, they did show me -- and quite frankly, it was an enormous surprise to see a centrifuge facility

that's able to enrich uranium for the second path to the bomb.

What was surprising was the sophistication and the size of that facility. And the best as we know, that's the last time that we know that anybody

outside of North Korea has been in their nuclear complex.

The best that we can tell, you know, from overhead is that they've continued to expand that complex substantially. And so whereas the

plutonium path to the bomb, for which you use nuclear reactors, that they have one small, old reactor that, at best, can make one bomb's worth a


Having opened up the centrifuge capacity, that perhaps today allows them to make as many as six bombs of highly enriched uranium variety per year.

So they had expanded, over these last five years, significantly their capacity to increase the size of the arsenal. And certainly one thing I've

argued for over and over is to try to get them not to test, so in order that they wouldn't increase the sophistication of that arsenal.

AMANPOUR: Well, Professor Hecker, that's the big question, isn't it, how does one -- it doesn't seem that anybody or anything has much influence.

As I posed to Director General Amano, neither sanctions nor engagement -- and both have been tried over the last 10 years or so under several

different U.S. administrations.

China doesn't seem to be making much inroads either.

What has to happen now?

HECKER: Well, of course, that's very difficult, especially for a scientist to answer. But what I have been trying to promote for a number of years by

watching how the size and the sophistication of the program has actually changed, is the diplomatic route to get North Korea to what I call the

three nos, no more bombs, no better bombs and no export.

In other words, to stop it from getting worse. And, in my opinion, that diplomatic engagement has actually not been sufficient. I think we sat

back, the entire world -- this is not just the United States; it's China and the rest of the world -- and have actually watched North Korea go from

-- you know, 2003 is most likely when they built their first bomb.

In 2005 to 2008, I used to say, well, they have the bomb but not a nuclear arsenal.

Well, today they have a nuclear arsenal. And by continuing to test, they make that arsenal more threatening. So I think one does have to go --

we've missed too many opportunities, the international community, over the past dozen years.

One has to go back.

One has to recognize and understand why does North Korea want the bomb in the first place?

And certainly their most important part is for national security. One has to recognize that. And then in the end, you have to make it more

attractive for them to give up the bomb and, you know, hopefully more expensive for them to continue the path that they are on.

AMANPOUR: Professor Hecker, thank you for your unique insight. And it is indeed a troubling situation.


AMANPOUR: The view from one of the world's leading authorities on North Korea's nukes.

And coming up, a deadly anniversary. One year after the "Charlie Hebdo" attacks a terror suspect is shot dead, trying to attack a Paris police

station. After surviving last year's attack, the cartoonist, Riss, looks back on a year of hope and heartbreak.





AMANPOUR: Welcome back to the special weekend edition and, at the end of this week, the world held its breath when news broke again that a suspected

terrorist attack was underway in Paris a year to the day after terrorists stormed the satirical magazine, "Charlie Hebdo," and killed 12 people.

On Thursday, police shot and killed the man who tried to enter a police station, wielding a knife and wearing what turned out to be a fake

explosive belt.

"Charlie Hebdo" has issued a special anniversary edition, whose cover depicts God carrying a gun and the caption, "One year on, the assassin

still at large."

It was drawn by Riss, who survived last year's attack and who sat down exclusively with our Jim Bittermann to reflect on that nightmare day and to

ponder what it all means for the future.


RISS (through translator): This past year has been very difficult. We had to rebuild the newspaper. We had to rebuild ourselves, confront our pains.

So it is, on the one hand, a personal struggle. It was a personal fight.

So here we are, one year later, with a vision which might be even a little more pessimistic today than it was one year ago.

JIM BITTERMANN, CNN SR. INTL. CORRESPONDENT: Is it more difficult to be funny now than before?

RISS (through translator): No, it's -- we always manage to find the urge to laugh because we have the will to live; to laugh is like going to the

restaurant. It's like going to a bistro for drinks. It's a pleasure that one has to continue to have. We don't have less of an urge to laugh.

BITTERMANN: I think you said that you're no longer going to do any caricatures of Muhammad.

Why is that?

RISS (through translator): I didn't say that. I said it was a question of circumstances and that we don't rule out anything. Maybe one day again

we'll draw Muhammad as a matter of principle.

BITTERMANN: Are you worried today about another attack?

Are you always looking over your shoulder?

RISS (through translator): We always have to be careful. We still have police protection. And at the newspaper, we installed top security


But, yes, we work with that idea in the back of our mind, that maybe something, someday may happen again.

Is freedom of speech more difficult to happen than before?

I think it is still as hard. I think it wasn't easier before.

We need to separate two things. French law allows for a lot of freedom. In the end, that's what counts, that the law prevails and protects us.

After that, one has to have the courage to seize that right and put it to use. We can't sink into self-censorship.

BITTERMANN: How do you put in perspective the two attacks, the one you were involved in and the 13th of November, which involved several hundred


RISS (through translator): I may be wrong but I'm under the impression that after January 7th and maybe even before, the authorities feared this

type of thing could happen.

But how do you get a population to understand something before it has even happened?

Maybe we had to wait until November 13th so that everyone could realize that such attacks could hit everyone and not only cartoonists. I get the

feeling things were out of sync between what the political powers had understood was going to happen and the population, who could not imagine

such events could take place.

I would say that, perhaps since November 13th, it has become easier for the political powers to take measures, such as a state of emergency. I don't

think a state of emergency would have been accepted before then.


BITTERMANN: You're printing a million copies this week of "Charlie Hebdo" on the anniversary issue. Here's the cover.

Can you explain what that cover means?

RISS: (Speaking French).

BITTERMANN: What is it exactly -- for our English-speaking audience?

RISS (through translator): It is a caricature representing the symbolic figure of God. To us, it's the very idea of God that may have killed our

friends a year ago. So we wanted to widen our vision of things. Faith is not always peaceful. Maybe we should learn to live with a little less of


BITTERMANN: So this is not Muhammad?

RISS (through translator): No, this is not Muhammad. It's above him. It's the God of all believers.

BITTERMANN: In the end, the attacks on "Charlie Hebdo" were because you printed the caricature of Muhammad. You lost a lot of friends. You

yourself were wounded.

Was it worth it?

RISS (through translator): We don't look at it that way. We don't think, we'll draw because it's worth it. We'll draw in a calculated manner.

We draw spontaneously because, for us, it didn't seem such a big deal. In the beginning to us, it was -- it was a spontaneous, uncalculated gesture.

We didn't force ourselves to draw Muhammad. No. It was an obvious thing to do.

Therefore, we don't ask ourselves, was it worth doing?

It's as if we were to say, is it worth living, laughing, having fun?

If that were the case, you wouldn't do anything.

So we didn't ask ourselves a question like that. For us, it seems obvious that in a country such as France, a secular country, we had the right to

draw whatever we wanted.

BITTERMANN: Well, thank you very much.

RISS: Merci beaucoup.


AMANPOUR: Riss with our Jim Bittermann in Paris.

And after a break, we return to North Korea, as we imagine a world where the Hermit Kingdom worked with the West to bin its nukes. It sounds like

the stuff of dreams right now. But not so long ago it was reality that I witnessed. The North Korea that was -- next.




AMANPOUR: And finally tonight, imagine a world where secretive paranoid North Korea looked like it was playing ball by eliminating its nuclear

threat. That's the North Korea that I, along with a small handful of journalists, witnessed in 2008.

We thought it would be interesting now to look back at our trip to the Yongbyon nuclear plant in light of what's just happened.


AMANPOUR (voice-over): We are 60 miles outside the capital, Pyongyang, driving down a long, bumpy road on the way to a tightly shuttered outpost

at the center of worldwide controversy.

AMANPOUR: Thank you for having us. We're very interested to see what's going on here.

AMANPOUR (voice-over): This is the top-secret Yongbyon nuclear plant, where North Korea used to make energy and has made plutonium for nuclear


AMANPOUR: Shall we?


AMANPOUR (voice-over): This is the last place we thought the North Koreans would ever let us film. But they want to make a point to CNN and to the


AMANPOUR: Oh, it's black as anything in there. Oh, it's scary as hell.


AMANPOUR (voice-over): In February 2007, North Korea agreed to disable Yongbyon in exchange for fuel oil, trade and being removed from the U.S.

list of state sponsors of terrorism.

AMANPOUR: Is it strange for you to have press here?

AMANPOUR (voice-over): Though some might call this a carefully choreographed show --

AMANPOUR: You said the heart has been removed and only the shell remains.

AMANPOUR (voice-over): -- the tour appeared to be a sincere effort to prove that they have shut the plant down.

On a hillside, overlooking the Yongbyon nuclear plant, North Korean officials set up a reviewing stand and seats for the U.S. State Department

delegation and the others, who had come to witness the destruction of their cooling tower.

As dignitaries, technical experts and the handful of invited press waited, an official from the plant gave the signal.

First, a warning flare and, three minutes later, a massive cloud of smoke. As the tower crumbled, the sound of the blast finally hit the air. There

was a moment of stunned silence as it sank in. And then a quiet handshake between Sung Kim, the U.S. point man on North Korea, and Lee Yong-ho, the

director of safeguards at Yongbyon.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: This is a complete demolition of the cooling tower. This is a very significant disablement step.

AMANPOUR (voice-over): Dr. Lee said that he was sad to see his life's work destroyed. And yet --

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (Speaking foreign language).

AMANPOUR (voice-over): -- he said, "I hope the explosion of the cooling tower will make a contribution to peace, not only for the Korean Peninsula

but for the whole world."

It had taken North Korean experts two weeks to carefully lay the explosives. U.S. monitors watching with bated breath were impressed.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: It's not very simple to blow it up and make it come down and they did a very good job.

AMANPOUR (voice-over): After surveying the rubble, the State Department's Sung Kim said the stage is now set for the next phase of negotiations, to

fully dismantle Yongbyon and hand over the plutonium, including the bombs it has produced.


AMANPOUR: That was then and that was it for plutonium processing.

But two years later, as you've just heard just earlier in the program, our guest, Siegfried Hecker, was shown a new secret facility right there for

enriching uranium, the other route to the bomb.

At the end of last year, north Korea fully and officially restarted the facility. And it started this new year with a big and ominous bang.

That is it for our program tonight. Remember, you can always now listen to our podcast, see us online at and follow me on Facebook and

Twitter. Thank you for watching and goodbye from London.