All too many times in the past, intelligence reports of terrorist plans—even against specific targets—have failed to prevent horrific strikes. In 1983, we had a number of reports that terrorists were targeting the U.S. Marine compound in Beirut. On Oct. 23, 1983, 241 U.S. soldiers were killed.

Intelligence reports that are detailed enough to act upon—like those that helped thwart recent plots against our embassies in Paris and Singapore—are unusual. That fact of life is frustrating to intelligence officers and Presidents.

It was inevitable that as the months passed after Sept. 11, reports, memos and speculations would be found that, in retrospect, would seem to have provided early warning—if only someone had connected the dots. While some pre-9/11 items of intelligence today seem like red flags, pulling together incomplete or ambiguous fragments of information into a credible and compelling analysis is more difficult than the Monday-morning quarterbacks would have you think. Especially doing so convincingly enough to prompt high-level, high-risk decisions.

A key problem prior to Sept. 11 was structural. Since 1986, representatives of a number of national security organizations and the FBI have worked together daily in the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, where information from abroad is shared, integrated, analyzed and acted upon. Before Sept. 11, there was no comparable formal organization for working-level contact among the domestic agencies of government—or between them and the national security agencies. While there appear to have been a few dots to connect, there was no effective mechanism for those connecting lines to cross domestic and national security boundaries.

Only at the NSC level did the two sides of the government come together regularly to share information. In the aftermath of the tragedy, the Office of Homeland Security has set about creating a central organization in which information can be brought together, analyzed and, if appropriate, acted on.

Before Sept. 11, we were a different country, and Washington was a different city, where turf issues prevailed and concern about CIA and FBI “overreaching” trumped concern for security. In retrospect, clues were almost certainly missed, and, as is Washington’s way, blame will be attributed. However, for the future, a thoughtful, balanced congressional inquiry can identify the pre–Sept. 11 structural and bureaucratic impediments to information sharing and better coordination across the government, and can recommend changes that improve our defenses against terrorism. But using fragments of information as ammunition against the President, the CIA, the FBI and others—absent context—will only delay tackling the real problems.

Gates was CIA director under President George H.W. Bush

An FBI Field Agent
...and an Agent Speaks Out Against the Blame Game

Everyone is caught up in the blame game. But nobody talks much about the fact that the now-famous Phoenix FBI memo, which warned last July that terrorists might be studying in American flight schools, is hardly unusual. The memo raised the possibility of attacks similar to what occurred. But reams of other, equally plausible memos — written before and after 9/11—are in the files as well. A constant stream of theories and proposals comes from FBI field offices to the bureau's headquarters in Washington. We agents see things we think are worth a closer look. We recommend opening a case. We recommend a wiretap, an undercover operation or around-the-clock surveillance. But all proposals need to be reviewed for legality, practicality and the potential of public backlash.

If the Holland Tunnel in New York City imploded from a terrorist attack tomorrow, you could then find official memos about the vulnerability of that tunnel. Convicted terrorists are in prison now for conspiring to take it out. But that doesn't mean we should close it down or round up the Muslims who drive through it every day.

The Phoenix memo's main proposal — a nationwide sweep of flight schools in search of al-Qaeda terrorists — now appears to be solid and rational. But if I had been a unit chief at FBI headquarters reading it last summer, my first thought would have been that such a sweep would lead to a massive hue and cry over "profiling" of Muslims. I would have been disinclined to push the memo upstairs. To justify such a sweep would have required far more than knowing that bin Laden was possibly trying to hijack a plane.

Politicians and the media are talking about a failure to connect the dots, and the FBI and CIA can do more to share information with each other and local police. (Since 9/11, the bureau has been sharing raw reports just so it is not accused of holding anything back.) But I have not seen any pre-9/11 dots that could have been connected, at least with the FBI operating under current laws and guidelines. If we want to throw away most of the requirements for due process, then there is a lot more the FBI and police could do. But does the country want to go there?

I don't think so. The public expects FBI agents to use instinct to surgically extract terrorists from society — and to do it without inconveniencing the public or infringing on innocent lives. Americans have unrealistic expectations about what law enforcement can do in a society in which personal freedom is deemed more important than public safety. Americans say they will give anything to be safe from terrorists. They don't really mean it. They would rather live in a free society than be completely safe. That means some dots won't ever be connected.

The agent, a veteran of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, asked to remain anonymous.